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Employer-Sponsored Pension Plans under the Charter
Abstract
Employer-sponsored pension plans under the Ontario Pension Benefits Act discriminate against women
because their structure and design are oriented to the typical male worker. Ms. Losie illustrates this and
proposes a strategy under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to challenge the constitutionality of private
pension legislation. The doctrine of discriminatory purpose and disproportionate impact are borrowed from
American constitutional law and applied to the section 15 guarantees of "equal benefit of the law" and
"equality under the law." Ms. Losie concludes that the narrow reading given to the American Bill of Rights can
and should be rejected in favour of the broad language employed by the Charter so that discriminatory
legislation might be more easily struck down.




Employer-sponsored pension plans under the Ontario Pension Benefits Act dis-
criminate against women because their structure and design are oriented to the
typical male worker. Ms. Losie illustrates this and proposes a strategy under
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to challenge the constitutionality of private
pension legislation. The doctrine of discriminatory purpose and disproportion-
ate impact are borrowed from American constitutional law and applied to the
section 15 guarantees of "equal benefit of the law" and "equality under the
law." Ms. Losie concludes that the narrow reading given to the American Bill of
Rights can and should be rejected in favour of the broad language employed by
the Charter so that discriminatory legislation might be more easily struck
down.
I. INTRODUCTION
A proliferation of reports on pensions spanning years of public de-
bate clearly indicate that women are the prime victims of the inadequa-
cies of present systems. Despite the fact that these reports recommend
a range of feasible reforms legislatures have generally failed to exercise
their authority over pension schemes' to remedy the discriminatory ef-
fect 2 particularly prevalent in employer-sponsored pensions plans.
These private pension plans will be the focus of this paper.
Some provincial legislation purportedly designed to improve and
regulate employer-sponsored pension plans does exist. One such piece
of legislation is the Pension Benefits Act3 of Ontario. However, this Act
fails to afford working women the beneficial position which their male
counterparts enjoy, and thereby violates the equality guarantees of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.4 To avoid being challenged
o Copyright, 1984, Claudia Losie
* Member of the 1985 graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law School.
Section 94A of the Consitution Act, 1867, 30-31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item I of Sched. to
the Constitution Act, 1982, Sched. B of the Canada Act 1982 1982, c. II (U.K.), confers concur-
rent federal and provincial power to make laws in relation to old age pensions.
I However, an amendment to the Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-5, which was
initially vetoed by the Province of Ontario, has been enacted. Section 48(1.1) of the Act, which
allows parents to temporarily "drop out" of the paid labour force in order to provide full-time care
in the home to children under the age of seven, will enable a working woman (or man) to choose
between conflicting responsibilities without fearing a reduction of the Canadian pension plan bene-
fits to which she (or he) may be eligible.
3 R.S.O. 1980, c. 373, as am. by 1983, c. 2 [hereinafter Pension Benefits Act].
4 Part I (ss. 1-34) of the Constitution Act, 1982 Sched. B of the Canada Act 1982, 1982, c.
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under the Charter the Ontario legislature may have to amend certain
portions of the Act.
II. HOW EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PENSION PLANS AND
THE PENSION BENEFITS ACT FAIL TO BENEFIT
WOMEN
A. General
The private pension system consists of employer-sponsored pension
plans in the private and public sectors. In 1982, the plans operating in
Canada totalled 15,232 in number and covered 4,658,000 workers or
46.8 per cent of the paid employees in the labour force.5
The participation in private pension plans in Canada can be mea-
sured in different ways, producing different results. In 1982, 44.8 per
cent of men and 30.6 per cent of women in the total labour force were
covered by pension plans." In terms of all paid employees, these ratios
increased to 50.1 per cent and 33.7 per cent, respectively. Regardless of
the method of measurement, women are less frequently covered in such
plans than are men.7
Data compiled from income tax returns provide some indication of
the number of private plans beneficiaries and the pensions they receive.
In 1981, the average pension received by women from private plans
was $3,663 while men received $5,613. Of the total number of private
plans beneficiaries, 36.3 per cent were women and 63.7 per cent were
men.8 Dollars from employer-sponsored pension plans are, thus, very
unevenly distributed between the sexes. Although pension benefits from
employer-sponsored plans are not the only source of income for our
senior citizens, the above statistics leave no doubt that the inadequacy
II (U.K.).
Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada. 1982, Cat. 74-401 (1984).
I d. at 13.
7 Id. One reason for the lower female participation rate is the high concentration of female
workers in the trade, business and personal services industries where pension plan coverage is
significantly lower than in such industries as mining, construction and most manufacturing, where
male workers are predominant. In addition, this low coverage results from the tendency of women
to work part-time. In September of 1984, 71.2 per cent of all part-time workers were women:
Statistics Canada, The Labour Force, September 1984, Cat. 71-001, Vol. 39, No. 7 (1983), Table
31. Part-time workers are rarely eligible for employer-sponsored pension plans.
" See Statistics Canada, supra note 5, at 90. There are certain limitations in using income
tax returns as a source of data. No distinction is made between pension payments and other
supplementary benefits such as disability, widows' or orphans' pensions. Also, an undetermined
number of pensioners with low incomes may not have filed a tax return and would not be included
in a data base.
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of these plans contributed to the poverty of elderly women in Canada.9
It is not that private pension plans generally discriminate overtly
against women. 10 Rather, it is their design and application that result
in women receiving disproportionately low benefits. For example, the
pension system is earnings-related. Private and public pension plans
replicate for women the inequities of the existing wage system, thereby
producing consistently lower pension benefits. As one report points out:
Pension policy and work policy are inextricably intertwined . . . the pensions of
women will be unsatisfactory as long as they have a [disadvantaged] position in
the labour market.11
Second, the pension system is orientated to the needs of typical
male workers.
The prime target of employer-sponsored pensions is upper-middle-income males
who worked non-stop for the same organization all their lives, rising steadily
through the ranks as they got older. 2
In contrast, the private pension system "punishes" mothers who spend
most of their lives in the labour market but stop for a few years to take
care of their children.' 3 On the same note, employer-sponsored plans
fail to take into account the fact that women change jobs more fre-
quently than men. 4 Pension rights can seldom be transferred from one
' Although the median income of elderly Canadian women is not known, it is known that
spouseless elderly persons are the poorest of elderly Canadians and that spouseless women com-
prise three-quarters of the group: See Dulude, Pension Reform with Women in Mind (1981) at
34.
" Few employer-sponsored pension plans today have different eligibility criteria for men and
women. In Ontario in 1982, fifty-one private plans out of a total of 8,653 had conditions of eligi-
bility which varied by sex. However, some plans are less subtle and simply exclude women alto-
gether. Forty-one employer-sponsored pension plans in Ontario in 1982 were restricted to men
only. Two plans were for women only. See Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada - Advance
Information (unpublished, 1982), Table F4. Insurance companies do not use unisex mortality ta-
bles. The result is that a woman who takes her pension credits to a life insurance company to
purchase a life annuity will be offered a lower monthly or yearly sum than than a man because of
her longer life expectancy. The workers affected are those who belong to "money purchase" types
of plans. This insurance practice is unjust because, in reality, eighty percent of male and female
pensioners of the same age have the exact same year of death: See Dulude, supra note 9, at 57.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently declared it illegal for a pension plan to pay a
higher annuity to a man than to a woman: Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred An-
nuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Nathalie Norris 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
X Collins, Women and Pensions (1978) at 1-2.
" Dulude, supra note 9, at 19.
" Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Pension Reform for Women (1981)
at I.
14 Statistical calculations of female turnover rates are scarce. There is data with respect to
job tenure by sex in Canada which compares men and women as to length of service with their
present employers. However, one of the classifications used is "six to ten years of service"; the
telling analysis for the purpose here would have been a comparison of men and women who had
achieved six to nine years of service with their employers. Nevertheless, in September of 1984,
almost 80 per cent of female workers had been with their employer for ten years or less, while the
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job to another. Workers who do not stay long enough with their em-
ployer also lose their pension rights. Because of these factors women
are less frequently guaranteed a pension when they retire. 15 Assuming
that the employer does offer a pension plan, in order to qualify for it, a
woman may be compelled to forego an active role as a mother and
better job opportunities, and remain in a dead-end, low-paying job.
Third, the pension system perpetuates male-centred concepts of
dependency. A traditional notion "which still assumes a woman is
mainly protected through being her husband's dependent. . . is clearly
inadequate in a world where one marriage out of three will end in di-
vorce."'16 Further, the view of working women as "secondary wage-
earners" is rapidly losing its rationale since women, like men, are enter-
ing the labour force in order to support themselves and their families.
Finally, private pension plans are unfair to women because they
fail to recognize the value of the wife's contribution to her marriage
and the economic welfare of society.'7 This is most obvious when one
spouse dies. For example, in a family in which the husband is the only
wage earner and the wife dies, the widower usually continues to receive
a full pension from his former employer. In contrast, if the wife sur-
vives her husband, she can expect nothing at all from her husband's
employer-sponsored pension plan.' 8 In addition, private pension credits
accumulated during marriage are generally not divided upon divorce or
separation.' 9
B. In the Context of the Pension Benefits Act
Four major inter-related structural deficiencies in employer-spon-
sored plans can be identified as contributing to women receiving limited
pension protection. They are: (1) long vesting requirements; (2) poor
pension portability; (3) an absence of indexing for inflation; and (4)
poor provision of survivor pensions. Although each of these may affect
the adequacy of pension benefits which a man can expect upon retire-
ment, their effect on a woman's benefits is much more dramatic. While
considering these deficiencies, the relevant provisions of the Pension
comparable figure for men was 66.5 per cent. Only 21 per cent of all female employees had
remained in their present job for eleven years or more, while 33.1 per cent of male employees had
stayed more than ten years with the same employer: Statistics Canada, supra note 6, Table 25.
15 These and other factors will be considered more fully in the analysis of the Pension Bene-
fits Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 373, as am. by 1983, c. 2., see text at 516-24, infra.
18 Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, supra note 13, at 1.
1' A full discussion of pension reform for homemakers is beyond the scope of this paper.
18 Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, supra note 13, at 1.
19 Dulude, supra note 9, at 73.
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Benefits Act, will be analysed.
At the outset, it is necessary to present a brief overview of the
Act.20 This Act, first passed in 1965, establishes the Pension Commis-
sion of Ontario, which is generally mandated to promote the establish-
ment, extension and improvement of pension laws throughout Onta-rio. 21 Every employer who makes contributions to its pension plan is
required to file a copy of the plan with the Commission for registra-
tion. 22 The Act requires that the pension plans be organized and ad-
ministered in accordance with its provisions and it is the function of the
Commission to supervise and review the plans to ensure that they com-
ply with the Act.23
Although the Act makes certain improvements to the private pen-
sion system in Ontario, a closer examination will reveal that the Act
does not specifically or adequately address the four key concerns of
women outlined above. Indeed, the Ontario legislature must take re-
sponsibility for the creation of, or at least acquiescence in, some of the
inequalities which women suffer under the existing private pension
system.
1. Vesting and Locking In
Vesting refers to the employee's right to receive the contributions
made by the employer on the employee's behalf. Prior to vesting, an
employee is usually only entitled to the return of his or her own contri-
butions. Locking in means that the contributions made by or on behalf
of the employee cannot be reimbursed, but rather, the employee can
draw on the vested benefits only in retirement.
The Pension Benefits Act attempts to improve vesting provisions in
employer-sponsored plans. Section 20 provides:
(1) A pension plan . . . shall contractually provide that,
(a) a member of the plan who has been in the service of the employer for a
continuous period of ten years, or has been a member of the plan for such
period, whichever first occurs, and who has attained the age of forty-five years,
is entitled, upon termination of his employment prior to his attaining retirement
age, to a deferred life annuity commencing at his normal retirement age ...
Section 20 also "locks in" benefits by providing that a member of a
20 The following provinces and territories in Canada are those in which there is in force
legislation substantially similar to the Ontario Act: Alberta, Quebec, Saskatachewan, Manitoba,
Nova Scotia, the Northwest Territories and Yukon Territory.
21 Pension Benefits Act R.S.O. 1980, c. 373, as am. by 1983, c.2, ss. 2 and 10(1).
22 Thus, only those plans which are wholly funded by employees' contributions under the
terms of the plan, are exempt from the provisions of the Act.
23 Contravention of the Act or the regulations is an offence punishable by fine: s. 39.
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plan who is "vested" under clause (a) is not entitled to withdraw any
part of the contributions to the plan (except voluntary additional con-
tributions), and those contributions must be applied towards a deferred
life annuity.
The "ten and forty-five" rule imposed by sub-section 20(1) is a
minimum standard. Therefore, a pension plan may provide for vesting
or locking in at an earlier age than forty-five years or upon service or
membership in the plan for less than ten years, or for both.24 The "ten
and forty-five" rule is, however, mandatory in the sense that where
vesting provisions in a pension plan are non-existent or less generous,
the contractual terms of the Act will be added to, or will replace, those
already existing in the plan.
Workers who terminate their employment before meeting the vest-
ing provisions in the Act, or in the pension plan whichever are most
generous, lose the contributions made by their employers on their be-
half. Employees are generally allowed to withdraw their own contribu-
tions, if any exist, plus interest which is calculated at a very low rate.
However, they will not have any benefits when they retire.21
Statistics are very scarce with respect to the percentage of male
and female plan members who meet the legal conditions entitling them
to a deferred pension. However, in 1980, based on a study carried out
by Yves Balcer and Izzet Sahin, the Ontario Royal Commission on the
Status of Pensions concluded that:
there was sufficient indication that present job mobility patterns, particularly for
women, were such that the present vesting rule of age 45 with 10 years' service
would be of little assistance in preserving pension rights for many covered
workers.
28
The purpose of the study was to determine the comparative merits of
different vesting rules. The issue was, as a function of vesting rules and
termination rates how many years of an employee's service would, on
average, be pensionable?
For the purposes of the analysis, the following assumptions were
made: employees would enter the work force at age twenty in the year
1980 and retire at age sixty-five; the employee would, throughout em-
24 Pension Benefits Act s. 20(3)(a).
25 Suprisingly, some contributory plans do not refund employee contributions not locked in
by legislation on termination of employment. In 1980, there were 286 such plans covering one
percent of all contributory plan members in Canada: Statistics Canada, supra note 6, at 54. It is
also worth noting that the Pension Benefits Act does not require that employee contributions not
locked in under s. 20 be refunded to the employee upon termination.
26 2 Ont., Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario (1980) at
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ployment, work for employers with pension plans.17 Five vesting rules
were selected for study. For the purposes of this paper, the most rele-
vant were the most stringent rule, that is, age forty-five and ten years'
service, and the most liberal rule of five years' service at any age. The
years of pensionable service of men and women were compared, using
their respective termination rates in the public service.
Under the "ten and forty-five" rule, male employees could expect
on average to have a pension based on 33.4 years of service. Thus, 74.2
per cent (33.4 years out of a possible forty-five) of an average male
employee's total service would be pensionable. As regards female em-
ployees subject to the "ten and forty-five" rule, the ratio of pensionable
service to total years would be only 60.4 per cent. Thus, the female
worker would be pensioned on only 27.2 years of service. If the vesting
rule were five years' service, 91.3 per cent of a male employee's total
service would be pensionable, compared to 88.9 per cent for a female
employee.2" Therefore, under the "ten and forty-five" rule, "high turn-
over rates among females in the public service, as in most types of em-
ployment, mean less pensionable service in total and hence lower pen-
sions ' 29 than males. While the model assumes that a terminating
employee goes immediately to a new employer who also provides a pen-
sion plan, it must be remembered that women are more likely than men
to have gaps in their work history and consequently in their plan mem-
bership due to home-making and child-rearing responsibilities. As a re-
sult, the study produces figures higher than one can expect in the real
world; that is, the loss of pensionable service through job mobility is
more serious for women than can be shown by the model."0 The impor-
tant point, however, is that it is clear from the above figures that a
vesting condition of five years' service of less would better equalize the
average accumulation of pensionable service for men and women.
In conclusion, the likelihood that women would achieve vested sta-
tus under the "continuous ten year service or participation" require-
ment in section 20 of the Act is considerably lower than for a man in
view of important differences between male and female career patterns.
Furthermore, attainment of forty-five years as an additional vesting
condition is especially onerous for women since their participation in
27 Id. at 39-40. It was also assumed that the plans provide immediate eligibility for member-
ship, and that the employee elects to join or is required to join when first eligible; that an em-
ployee who changes employment always goes to another employer with a similar type of pension
plan.
28 Id. Table 14 at 42.
29 Id. at 45.
30 Id. at 45.
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the labour force tends to fall off once they reach the age of thirty-five
and over.3 ' The rule's disproportionate impact on women would dra-
matically diminish if all employers were required to vest benefits after
perhaps one of two years of service, without regard to age.
A much shorter vesting period would also put an end to the mas-
sive subsidization of the private pension system by female workers. At
present, the employer contributions for workers who leave before their
pensions vest are used to lower the cost of benefits to the remaining
employees. In addition, the interest a pension plan collects on workers'
contributions is much higher than that which it pays employees when
they leave. In a period of high inflation, it is not unusual for the inter-
est rate on workers' contributions to be so high that some employers
need make little or no contribution.32
2. Portability
A portable pension is one which can be transferred from one em-
ployer to another with a change in jobs. That pension plans be more
portable is of particular concern to highly mobile female workers. How-
ever, the question of making pensions transferable from one employer
to another raises serious practical difficulties. One problem is that there
cannot be a job-to-job transfer system unless all employers have pen-
sion plans, which is certainly not the case today. Furthermore, it can be
difficult to assign a precise value to future pension rights.
Although paragraphs 38(1)(b) and (f) of the Act empower the
Lieutenant Governor in Council to make regulations governing trans-
fers of defined benefit pension plans from one employer to another,
none have been enacted. Yet, the problem of portability could be
avoided by having very short vesting requirements. If the Act made
shorter vesting the rule, not only would more women acquire vested
pension credits, but the credits of ex-employers could be retained in
their original plans to be paid out only when the workers attain retire-
ment age. The Pension Commission might then set up a central registry
for the purpose of keeping track of workers' pension credits and ensur-
ing that the appropriate benefits are paid out when they retire.83 Thus,
" In September of 1984, almost half of the women in the labour force were between the ages
of twenty and thirty-four inclusive. Those women between the ages of forty-five to sixty-five inclu-
sive comprised only one-fifth of the total female labour force: Statistics Canada, supra note 7,
Table 3.
32 The subsidization of the private pension system by female workers has been pointed out in
Dulude, supra note 9, at 21 and in Collins, supra note 11, at 199.
3 The Parliamentary Task Force on Pension Reform recommended the creation of the Reg-
istered Pension Account (R.P.A.) to which an employer would have the option of transferring the
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the more important issue is the long vesting requirements, not the lack
of portability of pension plans.
3. Protection Against Inflation
With the exception of public service plans, employer-sponsored
pension plans are notoriously inadequate in protecting their members
against the effects of inflation. In 1982, two-thirds of the members in
the Canadian public sector were in plans that provided for automatic
indexing of benefits for retired employees. The indexing was usually
based on full increases in the Consumer Price Index. In sharp contrast,
in the private sector, little more than five percent of the members were
in plans that provided for automatic indexing and it was most fre-
quently limited to an annual two or three percent, or a fixed dollar
amount. 4
The high rate of inflation in recent years has had the effect of
seriously eroding the purchasing power of pensions paid to retired em-
ployees in private plans. This rate of inflation is particularly hard on
the elderly female. Since on average women live longer than men, their
pensions, which are smaller at the outset, are eroded through inflation
over a longer period of time.
Compensation for increases in the cost of living during the plan
members' lives is a growing concern. Some employers claim to offer a
solution by, for example, using their employees' best or final earnings
to calculate pensions. However, this formula works more favourably for
men than for women. Why is this so? First, women are more likely to
be in the labour force when they are in their twenties and thirties.. If
they then leave with a a deferred pension, by the time they reach age
65, inflation will have eroded their best or final earnings to practically
nothing. Second, if all plans provided for full and immediate vesting,
the ultimate total pension of the highly mobile female worker would be
exactly as though the benefits had been based on her career average
earnings.3 5 The value of pension credits must increase with rises in the
cost of living, especially since short vesting might worsen the situation
value of vested pension credits: House of Commons Canada, Report of the Parliamentary Task
Force on Pension Reform (1983), at 53.
" Statistics Canada, supra note 5, at 48. Some employers in the private sector have in-
creased pensions on an ad hoc basis. An ad hoc adjustment is a single increase in the current
monthly payments to pensioners with no commitment that increases will be awarded in the future.
Unfortunately, data on these ad hoc adjustments have not been collected and, thus, the extent of
this practice is not known.
11 These and other criticisms of the best or final earnings formula have been made by
Dulude, supra note 9, at 24-25.
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by locking in depreciating funds which could have been profitably in-
vested elsewhere.
The Act does not require that employer-sponsored pension plans
be automatically indexed to the rate of inflation. The regulations only
stipulate the funding arrangement to be used by the employer in the
event that a pension plan is amended to increase pension benefits for
retired former employees or their beneficiaries. 36 Governments and em-
ployers might originally have based their inaction regarding indexa-
tion3 7 of pensions on the belief that inflation was a temporary phenome-
non.38 Their prediction of economic recovery simply has not been borne
out: inflation has proven to be a tenacious parasite, feeding particularly
on the purchasing power of people outside the work force who are no
longer able to protect themselves.
4. Survivor Pensions and Benefits
Outside of government employment, 39 the provision of survivor's
pensions is a sparsely developed area in the private pension system.4° In
1980, only 6.7 per cent of private sector plans in Canada, covering only
36 0. Reg. 746/80 as am. by 0. Reg. 262/82 under the Pensions Benefits Act s.2(4). Other
rather inconsequential regulations include s.14(7) (when a pension plan is terminated or wound
up, unfunded adjustments are not guaranteed protection) and s. 25 (where a pension benefit may
be reduced by reference to entitlements under public pension programmes, increased entitlement
due to an adjustment is protected or preserved.)
" As recent as 1983, the Task Force on Pension Reform rejected the notion of mandatory
inflation adjustment in respect of already accrued pension benefits. Instead, the Task Force recom-
mended that all plan sponsors be required to offer employees the option of taking indexed pen-
sions, which might have a lower starting level. A further recommendation was that all future
pension accruals be subject to a minimum degree of mandatory contractual updating after a plan
member terminates or retires; but such a requirement was recommended to come into effect three
years after enabling legislation has been adopted; supra note 32, at 46-50.
Employers have also used the defence of increased cost to justify their inaction in protect-
ing pension credits and benefits payable from inflation. A number of reports have proposed that
since interest rates tend to rise along with increases in the cost of living, employers could be
required to use the excess inflationary interest to update deferred pensions and pensioners' bene-
fits, instead of using the money to reduce their own contributions: See, e.g., Dulude, supra note 9,
at 56; Can., Task Force on Retirement Income Policy, The Retirement Income System in Canada:
Problems and Alternatives Policies for Reform (1979) at 225-31; and Can., Better Pensions for
Canadians (The Green Paper) (1982) at 26-28.
39 In 1980, some seventy-one per cent of all members in the public sector were in plans that
provided a survivor's pension in the event of death of the participating member before retirement.
Nearly seventy per cent of all public sector members were in plans that provided a survivor's
pension in the case of death after retirement. On death before retirement, only seven public sector
plans, covering a handful of all members, provided no death benefit. On death after retirement,
only eighteen public sector plans, covering less than one per cent of all members, provided no
death benefit: Statistics Canada, supra note 5, Tables 20 and 21.
'0 It should be emphasized here that a "survivor's pension" refers to a pension over and
above the plan member's basic pension. In contrast, the "survivor option" provides that the plan
member's pension can be reduced to provide a benefit to a survivor.
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twenty-four percent of members, provided a survivor's pension as an
additional benefit in the event of the death of the participating spouse
before retirement. In the case of death after retirement, only 4.3 per
cent of private sector plans, covering 21.8 per cent of members, pro-
vided a survivor's pension.4 All told, less than one widow in four can
expect to get any regular benefits from her husband's private employer.
In the private sector in 1980, more than 1,500 plans, covering
thirty percent of the members, provided no death benefit whatsoever,
not even a return of employee contributions, in the event of premature
death of the employee. In the case of death after retirement, no death
benefit was provided in over 1,300 plans, covering 22.4 per cent of the
membership.42 Thus, about one widow in four will get absolutely noth-
ing from her husband's private pension plan.
Where there is provision for a survivor's pension, most plans pro-
vide a life pension equal to only one-half of the deceased's pension. It is
anamolous that if the employee's spouse dies, the employee can still
look forward to a full pension, while if the employee dies, the surviving
spouse, usually female, will have to make do on a drastically reduced
amount. Further, most plans provide that a survivor's pension ceases
upon remarriage. The design of private pension plans perpetuates the
dependency of wives upon male employees. It rarely recognizes either
the responsibility of a woman for the provision of her family's income
or the contribution that a homemaker makes in enabling her husband
to pursue remunerative work in the labour force.
The Ontario legislature has intervened in the problem of poor pro-
vision of survivor benefits. The Act does not, however, provide for
mandatory survivor benefits in all plans. It extends a "survivor option"
to employees vested under the "ten and forty-five" rule, but only where
a pension plan is wound up or terminated.43 The survivor option is not
an extra benefit like a survivor's pension; rather, the plan member's
pension benefits are reduced in order to provide continuing benefits to a
beneficiary in the event of the member's death. However, few employ-
ees elect to take this option. In one 1979 report, by a Senate Commit-
tee on retirement age policies, it was determined that only ten percent
41 Statistics Canada, supra note 5, Tables 20 and 21.
42 Id. In all fairness to private employers, it should be mentioned that on the death of an
employee before retirement, approximately eighty percent of all plans provided for a refund of
employee contributions, or vested employer contributions, or both in a lump sum, albeit at a low
rate of interest. Where death occurs after retirement, eighty per cent of all plans, covering only
thirty-one per cent of all members, provided pension payments to the beneficiary for the remain-
der of a guaranteed period of usually five years.
3 Pension Benefits Act, s.26(3).
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of employees elect to take a "survivor option", whether offered by the
employer or compelled by statute." However, according to Statistics
Canada, the incidence of election is significantly lower with only one
per cent of employees choosing the option in 1980."' Clearly then, most
employees cannot be relied upon to make provisions for their surviving
wives, especially if it means taking a smaller pension during their own
lives. Consequently, many women are dependent on the financial plan-
ning of their husbands, who will, more likely than not, gamble on their
own futures. The "survivor option" is thus ineffective in providing wid-
ows with pensions.46
III. A STRATEGY FOR CHANGE: CHALLENGE OF THE
PENSION BENEFITS ACT UNDER THE CHARTER
As demonstrated in the preceding section of this paper, the design
of employer-sponsored pension plans dramatically favours men over
women. The poor pension protection afforded women is attributable, in
part, to four major deficiencies in many private pension plans. An anal-
ysis of the Pension Benefits Act establishes that the provisions do not
succeed in improving pension plans with respect to women. The Onta-
rio legislature has failed to intercede to make necessary remedial
changes and has thereby condoned the continued existence of sexual
inequality in the private pension system. This section will address the
manner and extent to which it might be argued that certain provisions
of the Act violate the equality rights guarantee contained in sub-section
15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
"" Can., Retirement Without Tears: Report of the Special Senate Committee on Retirement
Age Policies (1979) at 60 and 91, as referred to in Dulude, supra note 9, at 24.
5 Statistics Canada, supra note 5, Table 21.
4' Two provinces have taken a more liberal approach with respect to survivor benefits. In
Saskatchewan, all plans, which do not already provide survivor benefits, must provide a "joint and
survivor" feature. The reduction of the married workers' own retirement benefit, in order to pro-
vide a survivor's benefit, is also mandatory unless it has been renounced or waived in writing by
the employee and his or her spouse. The Manitoba legislature has gone even further. Every pen-
sion is deemed to belong "jointly" to the married employee and his or her spouse unless waived in
writing by both. Moreover, the legislation stipulates that, where no waiver is taken, the joint
pension may decrease by not more than one-third on the death of either the member or the
spouse. As Dulude has commented, a stiplulation that the pension would be reduced whichever
spouse died first would not only treat the spouses equally, but would also save a great deal of
money which could be used to keep the retirement benefit at a higher level: supra note 9, at 84-85.
With regard to pre-retirement survivor benefits, the Task Force on Pension Reform recommended
that all private pension plans be required to provide a joint life and last survivor benefit, declining
to sixty per cent on first death, with provision to choose an alternative form of annuity on consent
of both spouses: supra, note 32, at 55.
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A. The Threshold Questions: Sub-section 32(1)
The threshold questions which must be answered are:
1. Are employers, who offer pension plans to their employees,
bound by the terms of the Charter?
2. To what extent is the Pension Benefits Act challengeable
under the Charter?
Some assistance can be sought from the text of the Charter itself.
Sub-section 32(1) provides that the Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and Government of Canada in respect of
all matters within the authority of Parliament . . . ; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect
of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each
province.
The references to "Parliament" and "legislature" in sub-section 32(1)
suggest that the Charter applies to governmental, rather than private
action. It appears that the Charter will only bind private actors where a
connection to government can be established. While the Charter regu-
lates the relationship of an individual with the government by invalidat-
ing laws and governmental activities which infringe upon the guaran-
teed rights, the relationships between individuals will continue to be
regulated by human rights codes.4 7 Admittedly, the establishment of
pension schemes by employers for the benefit of their employees is a
private activity. As such, it is highly unlikely that a court would enter-
tain an application for relief against private employers on the ground
that the terms of their pension plans breach the provisions of the
Charter.48
Nevertheless, the Ontario legislature has intervened in the private
pension system by enacting the Pension Benefits Act, and the Charter
applies to the law-making activity of both the provincial legislatures
and Parliament.49 However, as already noted, the Ontario legislature
47 The importance of the enforcement mechanisms in human rights legislation has been rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Board of Governors of Seneca College v. Bhadauria
(1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 193, 17 C.C.L.T. 106 (S.C.C.), where the court rejected a woman's
attempt to seek judicial protection through a tort of racial discrimination. The philosophy of the
court was made clear. Discriminatory conduct between individuals is normally regulated through
human rights legislation .and administrative solutions.
48 It is arguable, however, that the Ontario Government as employer may not establish pen-
sion plans for its public servants in violation of the rights guaranteed in the Charter. By virtue of
s. 32(1), the "government" of each province is made subject to the Charter.
49 Support for the proposition that the Charter applies to statutes, and probably to regula-
tions as well, can be found in s. 52(l):
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has failed to impose legal obligations upon employers with respect to
three of the four deficiencies earlier identified in employer-sponsored
pension plans. There are, as yet, no regulations governing portability of
pension plans. The Act does not oblige employers to increase pension
benefits in keeping with inflation. Rather, in these two areas, the Onta-
rio legislature has left it up to individual employers to contractually
provide for such terms in their pension plans. Similarly, with respect to
the third deficiency, the "survivor option," the problem is that it is an
option, which the eligible employee may exercise. Individuals have, tra-
ditionally, been free to discriminate against others and to infringe on
another's rights to the extent that such conduct is not restrained by
legal obligations. The Charter does not contemplate imposing positive
obligations on legislative bodies to eliminate private sexual discrimina-
tion, nor to ensure the protection of fundamental freedoms from private
intervention. In the words of one commentator, "because the Charter's
purpose is to restrain government action, not to generate legislative ac-
tion, protection from reluctant legislatures does not exist."' 0 Thus, the
Ontario legislature's inactivity, or permissive law, with respect to porta-
bility, indexation and survivor benefits will likely raise no issues under
the Charter.
However, it may be argued that the "ten and forty-five" vesting
requirement embodied in paragraph 20(1)(a) of the Act is a law which
must be consistent with the provisions of the Charter or risk being de-
clared unconstitutional and therefore of no force or effect.5' The "ten
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent
with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or
effect.
By virtue of s. 52(2), the Charter is made a part of the Constitution of Canada.
50 Swinton, "Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," in Tarnopolsky
and Beaudoin, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Commentary (1982) at 47.
"I If, however, the "ten and forty-five" rule were declared of no force or effect by virtue of s,
52(1) then the situation of women under the private pension system would be worse. Less gener-
ous vesting criteria in pension plans, which the "ten and forty-five" rule now replaces, would again
be operative. Employers would be unrestrained either in making no provision for vesting or in
making conditions even more stringent than before. The remedy to be sought under the Charter is
legislative amendment to shorten the vesting period to allow more women to acquire pension
rights. Section 24 may provide the answer to the apparent dilemma created by s. 52(1). It reads:
Anyone whose rights and freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or
denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court
considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
The "appropriate and just" remedy in these circumstances would be judicial guidelines or direc-
tions to the legislature as to how regulatory vesting conditions must be drafted to avoid the exclu-
sion of women as a class from the benefit of the law. One might think this highly interventionist
approach is inappropriate for a court, yet similar "quasi-legislative" judgments have been written
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the protection of constitutional rights. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753 (1955); and Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
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and forty-five" rule imposes mandatory legal obligations upon employ-
ers who establish contributory pension plans for their employees in On-
tario. A legislature may not pass laws which would perpetuate inequal-
ity and discrimination in the workplace. To the extent that the Ontario
legislature has done this by enacting the "ten and forty-five" rule, a
constitutional challenge of the law lies under the Charter. The question
then becomes: how might one argue that the vesting requirement in the
Act violates the Charter?
B. Equality Rights: Sub-section 15(1)
The provision of the Charter with which the "ten and forty-five"
rule is, prima facie, inconsistent, is sub-section 15(1). Sub-section
15(1), entitled "Equality Rights," reads:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability. 52
Sub-section 15 employs a variety of phrases to express the idea of
equality and each will be analysed separately.
1. "Equal Before and Under the Law"
In response to a large number of representations by women before
the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons, the
language of sub-section 15 was changed to include "equal ...under
the law." This phrase was intended to ensure that judicial review ex-
tended to the content of the law, and not merely to the manner in
which the law is administered.
Under the Canadian Bill of Rights,53 the Supreme Court of Ca-
nada adopted a Diceyan interpretation of "equality before the law";
that is, equality of treatment in the enforcement and application of the
laws of Canada.54 The phrase, "under the law," as used in sub-section
15(1) is an attempt to overrule this restrictive conception exemplified in
the Lavell case.5"
2 By virtue of s. 32(2), s. 15 does not come into force until April 17, 1985, presumably to
give the federal and provincial governments time to amend their laws to conform with s.15.
13 1960, c. 44 (Can.)
" A.G. Can. v. Lavell; Isaac v. Bedard, [1974] S.C.R. 1349, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481, holding
that s. 12(b)(l) of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, which provided that an Indian woman, but
not an Indian man, would lose her Indian status upon marrying a non-Indian, was not rendered
inoperative by the equality rights guarantee in s. l(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.
" The Lavell interpretation of the Canadian Bill of Rights as guaranteeing only procedural
equality and not substantive equality was a regression from the previous Supreme Court of Ca-
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The phrase, "under the law," may also reverse the reasoning in the
pre-Charter Supreme Court of Canada decision in Bliss v. Attorney
General of Canada.5 6 The Court, in that case, not only reiterated the
Lavell version of "equality before the law," but also offered another
test; discrimination would be allowed if it was necessary to further a
"valid federal objective. '5 7 One study of the Bliss decision suggested
that the "valid federal objective" test is nothing more than a "distribu-
tion of powers" test.5 8 If the legislation was validly enacted by the fed-
eral government pursuant to its authority under section 91 of the Con-
stitution Act, 1867, then it could be said that the law has a "valid
federal objective," which would inevitably result in the law being
upheld.
However, the blow struck to equality of rights in the Bliss case
was later softened by Mr. Justice McIntyre of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the McKay59 case. He enunciated a more promising concep-
tion of equality, albeit only in principle, since the challenge was unsuc-
cessful. McIntyre J. stated that a valid federal objective must not only
fall within the field of constitutional legislative competence, but also,
must not offend the Canadian Bill of Rights.60 The judicial inquiry to
be undertaken was articulated by McIntyre J. as follows:
nada opinion in R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282, 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473. Drybones is the only case
in which the Canadian Bill of Rights has prevailed over another statute with regard to guaranteed
rights. In Drybones, s. 94(b) of the Indian Act, which made it an offence for an Indian to be
intoxicated off a reserve in the Northwest Territories, was held to be discriminatory against Indi-
ans under the Bill. Mr. Justice Ritchie, speaking for the majority, stated at 297 (S.C.R.), 484
(D.L.R.):
[A]n individual is denied equality before the law if it is made an offence punishable at law,
on account of his race, for him to do something which his fellow Canadians are free to do
without having committed any offence or having been made subject to any penalty.
Surely this was a case where the content of the law was scrutinized. Ritchie stated also that he
could not agree with an interpretation of "equality before the law" which would lead to the result
that "the most glaring discriminatory legislation against a racial group" would not offend the Bill
so long as all members of the group are being discriminated against in the same way. This view is
clearly a rejection of the Diceyan approach to equality rights.
56 [1979] S.C.R. 183, 92 D.L.R. (3d) 417. In Bliss, a pregnant woman was refused unem-
ployment insurance benefits even though she would have qualified for them had her reason for
unemployment not been pregnancy. Bliss was recently applied in Stuart v. A. G. Can (1982), 44
N.R. 320, 13 C.L.L.C. 324 (Fed. C.A.) where the pregnant woman applying for unemployment
insurance benefits had become unemployed due to an unrelated illess. The Court refused to con-
sider an argument based on s. 15 of the Charter since it had not yet come into effect.
57 Note that the Canadian Bill of Rights applies only to federal laws: s. 2.
58 See Gold, Equality Before the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada: A Case Study
(1980), 18 Osgoode Hall L.J. 336 at 346-47.
5 Mackay v. R., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370, 114 D.L.R. (3d) 393. In Mackay, trial by Standing
Court Martial under the National Defence Act for a criminal offence was held not to constitute a
denial of equality before the law.
60 Id. at 405-405 (S.C.R.), 422 (D.L.R.).
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[A]s a minimum it would be necessary to inquire whether an inequality has been
created for a valid federal constitutional objective, whether it has been created
rationally in the sense that it is not arbitrary or capricious and not based upon
any ulterior motive or motives offensive to the provisions of the Canadian Bill of
Rights, and whether it is a necessary departure from the general principle of
universal application of the law for the attainment of some necessary and desira-
ble social objective."1
Thus, McIntyre J. takes the view that the court must pass judgment on
both the means employed and the ends pursued by the law, similar, as
shall be seen later, to the kind of inquiry that is contemplated by sec-
tion 1 of the Charter.
Returning to the Pension Benefits Act, the court is guided by the
words "under the law" in section 15 and the dicta of McIntyre J., to
question the wisdom of the "ten and forty-five" rule to examine not
only the procedural aspects of the law, but also its substance. A chal-
lenge of the Act under the Charter cannot be dismissed by the Court
on the ground that the law, as worded, applies equally to men and
women, or, in other words, that the conditions to be fulfilled are the
same no matter whether one is male or female. Furthermore, the court
must consider the impact of the "ten and forty-five" rule. Lastly, the
Charter demands that the court look behind the age classification em-
ployed in the "ten and forty-five" rule to see whether or not it is
arbitrary.
2. "Equal Protection of the Law"
To assert that the equality rights guarantee in section 15 applies to
the content of the law and its administration does not provide the
courts with a standard of review. Equality rights demand that there be
some connection between classifications and objectives. McIntyre J.
speaks of a requirement that the means and ends be "rationally" con-
nected, while at the same time proposes that the distinction must be a
"necessary departure" for the attainment of "some necessary and desir-
able social objective." The standard of review to be applied, therefore,
is still imprecise.
62
Since "equal protection of the law" is a concept borrowed from the
Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution, 3 American ju-
61 Id. at 407 (S.C.R.), 423 (D.L.R.). Although McIntyre J. was in the minority, concurring
with Ritchie J., his inquiry was later considered by Desch6nes, C.J.S.C. in Que. Assoc. of Protes-
tant School Boards. v. A.G. of Que. (No. 2) (1983), 140 D.L.R. (3d), 33 at 77, 3 C.R.R. 114 at
158 (Que. S. Ct.).
62 See also, the discussion of s. 1 of the Charter, infra "The Limitation Clause: Section 1."
63 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, s. 1: "No state shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."
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risprudence is applicable to adjudication under the Charter. 4
a) The American Levels of Scrutiny
Prior to 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States employed a
two-tier standard of review. On the upper tier were classifications
which either infringed fundamental rights or were "inherently suspect"
as suggesting racial prejudice, and which triggered strict scrutiny; the
highest level of judicial review. Such classifications were presumed to
be invalid unless the government could satisfy the court that the partic-
ular classification was "necessarily related to a compelling state inter-
est" and that there were no alternative ways of achieving the state
objective.6 5 In practice, the test was so difficult to meet that all classifi-
cations falling within the upper tier were declared unconstitutional.6
In contrast, the lower tier includes all classifications that were not
"suspect" racial classifications or did not impinge on fundamental
rights and thus, attracted minimal scrutiny coupled with a strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality. As long as the classification could be said
to be "rationally related to a legitimate government purpose," the court
held it constitutional.6 " This test almost invariably resulted in the im-
pugned law being rubber-stamped by the court. Age-based distinctions
fell within this lower tier. Despite the analogy that can be drawn be-
tween race and sex,68 classifications based on gender also attracted only
minimal scrutiny.
However, some progress was made in 1971 in a case called Reed v.
Reed69 where the Supreme Court struck down legislation which classi-
fied on the basis of sex. One commentator pointed out that only if one
Laskin, C.J. in Morgentaler v. R., [1976] 1 S.C.R. 716, 54 D.L.R. (3d) 161, implies that
because the Bill of Rights is only an Act of Parliament, American jurisprudence is inapplicable to
its interpretation. This view can no longer stand because the Charter, like the American Constitu-
tion, is a constitutionally entrenched document.
" See Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978) at 1000-60 for a critical analysis of the
case law from which the standard of strict scrutiny developed.
6 In only one case did the Supreme Court of the United States uphold explicit racial dis-
criminastion after applying strict scrutiny: Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct.
193 (1944), sustaining a military order excluding Americans of Japanese origin from designated
West Coast areas following Pearl Harbour.
67 See Tribe, supra note 65, at 994-1000.
68 There are two main reasons why the Supreme Court of the United States treats race
classifications as "suspect" and, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny. There has been a long history
of prejudice against racial minorities, and race as a trait can never be altered by a simple act of
will. Thus, stereotyping these individuals as less worthy or less suited for certain roles by virtue of
an immutable trait has been singled out as unjust by the court. It is apparent that gender-based
discrimination shares this unjust-stereotyping flaw. See Tribe, supra note 65, at 1060.
69 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971), invalidating an Idaho statute requiring that males be
preferred to females as administrators of estates.
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assumes that the court was being especially suspicious of sex as a clas-
sifying factor can the result be understood.70
In 1973, the Supreme Court came close to treating gender classifi-
cations like race classifications when a plurality of justices in Frontiero
v. Richardson,7 held that sex-based classifications should be treated as
suspect. However, the fifth justice needed to constitute a majority on
this point concurred only in the result.72 The hesitancy of the other
justices can be explained, in part, by the pendency of the Equal Rights
Amendment.73 Three of the justices stated that the court should not
"appear unnecessarily to decide sensitive issues of broad social and po-
litical importance at the very time they are under consideration within
the prescribed constitutional processes.
'74
In 1976, in Craig v. Boren,75 the Supreme Court openly adopted
for the first time a standard of review based on intermediate scrutiny;
that is, classifications based on gender must "serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives."' 76 This standard was further enhanced in Wengler
v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co.,7 7 where the court held that the govern-
ment carries the burden of demonstrating both the importance of its
objective and the substantial relationship between the discriminatory
means and the asserted end.
Three propositions derived from American jurisprudence are use-
ful in successfully arguing that the "ten and forty-five" requirement
violates sub-section 15(1) of the Charter. First, the Supreme Court of
the United States does not consider administrative convenience to be an
"important" governmental interest. The Ontario legislature may not be
able to justify the "ten and forty-five" rule on the grounds that it was
70 Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine in a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection (1972), 86 Harv. L. Rev. I at 34.
71 411 U.S. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1804 (1973), holding unconstitutional federal statutes providing
that females spouses of members of the armed services were "dependents" for the purposes of
obtaining military benefits, but that male spouses of members were not "dependents" unless so
proven.
72 Stewart J., the fifth justice, found simply that the statutes "work[ed] an invidious discrimi-
nation." Id. at 691 (U.S.).
73 Section 1 of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) declares that "[e]quality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of
sex." H.R. Res. 208, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972). Although the ERA was passed by Congress,
not all of the legislatures have ratified it and, therefore, the amendment is not yet in effect.
7' Supra note 71, at 692.
7- 429 U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976), invalidating state statutes prohibiting the sale or beer
to males under the age of 21 and females under the age of 18.
76 Id. at 197, and see Tribe, supra note 65, at 1060-99 for a discussion of the development of
the intermediate standard of review.
77 446 U.S. 142, 100 S. Ct. 1540 (1980).
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less expensive or easier to frame the vesting requirements as it did. To
be sure, the Ontario legislature must be sensitive to the imposition of
increased financing on employers. However, our courts may follow the
American example by establishing that cost will not be a decisive
factor.
Second, Reed establishes that where the impugned legislation is
inspired by old and stereotypical notions about the proper allocation of
roles in the family, assigning to women the role of dependent, child-
bearer and housekeeper, and to men the role of breadwinner, the legis-
lation will fail.78 Certainly, the vesting conditions in the Pension Bene-
fits Act inhibit the exercise of liberty, by both men and women, in the
choice of social roles by penalizing any one who temporarily leaves
their employment to raise children, and by making it exceedingly diffi-
cult for a woman to obtain a pension in her own right.
Third, intermediate scrutiny, although not as fatal to a law as is
strict scrutiny, is a powerful standard of review.7 9 Moreover, in the con-
text of the Charter, gender-based classifications may trigger strict scru-
tiny, even though they do not under the American Bill of Rights. The
specification of "sex" as a prohibited basis of discrimination should be
interpreted to render it suspect. Because sub-section 15(1) expresses
specific disapproval of sex-based classifications, it should follow that
they will attract a strict standard of review." Also, the Charter con-
tains an additional guarantee of sexual equality in section 28:
Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in
it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.
The opening language, "notwithstanding anything in his Charter," may
7'8 See notes 69 to 77, supra and accompanying text.
7"' However, the American cases are often decided by a closely divided court, and some of the
justices, most notably Rehnquist J., see clear differences between the sexes. Rehnquist J. captured
the majority in two cases in 1981: Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981),
upholding the law establishing the male-only requirement for registration for the draft; and
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981) upholding California's
statutory rape law under which underaged men, but not underaged women, can be prosecuted for
engaging in consensual sexual intercourse. For a cogent criticism of these cases, see Williams,, The
Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism (1983), 7 Women's Rights
L. Rep. 175 at 180-86.
80 At the same time, there may be a problem with this argument because s. 15(1) contains a
diverse list of bases on which the government cannot discriminate. Should the same standard of
review apply to all of them? Doubtless, not all age-based classifications warrant strict scrutiny.
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suggest that the specified categories in s. 15(l) were intended
for different and more serious treatment than categories not singled out.
For other works which also argue for strict scrutiny of gender differentiations based on the
specification of "sex" in s. 15, see Seale, Can the Canadian Pension Plan survive the Charter?
Section 15(l) and Sex (In) Equality (as yet unpublished, 1983) at 22-23; and Williams, Sex
Discrimination Under the Charter: Some Problems of Theory (1983), 4 Can. Human Rights Rep.
I at 4-5.
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be interpreted as meaning that the equality rights guarantee is uncon-
ditional and can neither be limited by reference to section 1 nor over-
ridden by a legislature pursuant to section 33,81 thereby providing a
strong argument for applying strict scrutiny to sex-based distinctions.
Finally, section 28 of the Charter closely resembles, if not in words
then undeniably in spirit, the proposed Equal Rights Amendment in
the United States. It has been contended that the passage of the
Amendment would mandate the "compelling state interest" test used in
race cases,82 just as section 28 should.
b) The Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact Doctrine
It has been argued that gender classifications should trigger strict
scrutiny under the Charter. However, the "ten and forty-five" rule ap-
pears on its face to be neutral with respect to gender. The only overt
classification in paragraph 20(1)(a) of the Pension Benefits Act is one
based on whether an employee has served an employer or participated
in a pension plans for ten continuous years and has attained the age of
forty-five.8 3 But, as statistics have shown, the rule masks sex discrimi-
nation in that it overwhelmingly favours men.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that laws
may superficially apply to all persons but in reality they discriminate
by causing an adverse impact upon a particular class. Judicial recogni-
tion of such laws initially occurred in cases of racial prejudice, but re-
cently the doctrine has been extended to cases of sexual bias as well.
0' For an argument that the unconditional guarantee contained in s. 28 as applied to s. 15(1)
equality rights will effectively withdraw s. 15 from the operation of s. 1 when sex equality is at
issue, see Seale, id. at 36-42.
82 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 80, at 4; and Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Four-
teenth and Equal Rights Amendments (1979), Wash. U.L.Q. 161. Some commentators have even
suggested that gender classifications would be treated as illegal per se under the ERA. See Brown
et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women
(1971), 80 Yale L.J. 871.
83 The second limb of the legislative test for vesting, that is, whether or not one has attained
the age of 45, offends s. 15(1) by discriminating on the basis of "age", which is a ground for
discrimination expressly referred to in s. 15(1). Recall, however, that in the United States, age-
based classifications attract only minimal scrutiny and are inevitably upheld by the court. Under
the Charter, the standard of review applied to such classifications might be higher for two reasons:
(1) "age" as a classifying factor is specifically identified in s. 15(1) and, therefore, might
be given special status by the court; and
(2) when an American court applies the standard of minimal scrutiny, the burden of dem-
onstrating that the law was not justified lies on the challenger, while s. I of the Charter
places the burden of justification on the person defending the law and, therefore, affords
greater protection of equality rights when an age-based classification is challenged.
Nevertheless, a successful challenge to the age condition of the "ten and forty-five" rule would not
solve the whole problem; the onerous service and participation requirements would still remain.
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However, the leading racial case in this area, Washington v. Davis,"'
established that a law is not unconstitutional solely because it has a
racially disparate impact. The invidious quality of the law must ulti-
mately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose. Washington also
stands for the proposition that a showing of discriminatory intent is
necessary to trigger the standard of strict scrutiny. Failure to meet this
burden results in only minimal scrutiny being applied, in which case
the claim almost certainly fails.85 The court in Washington did, how-
ever, qualify its reasoning with statements to the effect that discrimina-
tory intent may often be inferred from all the relevant facts, including
the fact that the law affects one race more adversely than another, 80
and that, in proper circumstances, the racial impact of the law, rather
than its discriminatory purpose, is the critical factor in determining a
constitutional violation.8 7 The court did not elaborate on the circum-
stances necessary to tip the scale the other way.
Washington was applied in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Development Corporation.8 Arlington Heights con-
tained dicta which might assist someone challenging the Pension Bene-
fits Act under the Charter. According to that case, the discriminatory
purpose need only be a motivating factor and not the sole purpose of
the law.80 In addition, a search for intent calls for a "sensitive enquiry
into circumstantial and direct evidence," which can include, aside from
disproportionate impact, legislative history and contemporary state-
ments of decision-makers.90 Further, where a clear pattern emerges
from the effect of the state action, unexplainable on grounds other than
race (or sex) this may be determinative of discrimination.91
Another major case, Personnel Administration v. Feeney, 2 in-
426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976), holding that police recruiting procedures, including a
written verbal skills test, did not violate the guarantee of equal protection implicit in the Fifth
Amendment's due process clause, despite the fact that blacks failed the test at least four times as
often as whites.
81 In Washington, id. the black applicants did not charge discriminatory intent. Thus, freed
of any duty to look closely, the court applied the "rational basis" test and upheld the police
recruiting practices.
"' Supra note 84, at 241-42 (U.S.), 2048-49 (S. Ct.).
87 Id. at 242 (U.S.), 2049 (S. Ct.).
88 429 U.S. 252, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977), holding that there was no violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment because there was no discriminatory intent in the Village Commissioners' refusal to
re-zone a predominantly white area for multi-family residences, although the decision weighed
heavier on blacks than on whites.
'8 Id. at 265 (U.S.), 563 (S. Ct.).
90 Id. at 264-68 (U.S), 563-65 (S. Ct.).
91 Id. at 266 (U.S.), 564 (S. Ct.).
92 442 U.S. 256, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979), upholding a statute giving preference to veterans for
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volved an unsuccessful allegation of sex discrimination. Despite a mas-
sive adverse impact upon women, the court found that a Massachu-
sett's statute giving preference to veterans had not been adopted to
disadvantage women. The case might stand for the proposition that as
long as the legislation was passed in spite of its effect on women, rather
than because of its effect on women, it is not sex discrimination. 93 The
court also relied on the fact that a number of men were adversely af-
fected to negate any inference that the law was a pretext for preferring
men over women. This case does not bode well for a challenge of the
vesting criteria in the Pensions Benefits Act. However, Marshall J., dis-
senting in Feeney, stated,
[W]here a particular statutory scheme visits substantial hardship on a class long
subject to discrimination, the legislation cannot be sustained unless carefully
tuned to alternative considerations.
94
The requirement that discriminatory intent be shown has come under
attack by commentators who favour a pure impact test.95 The funda-
mental problem with the requirement of discriminatory intent is that
proof is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. Direct evidence is rare,
and the use of circumstantial evidence requires the court to draw infer-
ences. As one American Supreme Court Justice has stated,
[a]n approach based on motivation creates the risk that officials will be able to
adopt policies that are the products of discriminatory intent so long as they suffi-
ciently mask their motives. 96
Of equal concern is that apparently neutral legislation is often
[d]riven by social systems, structures and patterns which reflect far more deeply
than overt gender or race classifications, the social divisions and allocations made
by societies to benefit those traditionally in power and, however inadvertently or
unconsciously, to disadvantage those whose needs and perceptions have not been
represented in the decision-making process. 7
civil service jobs, even though the vast majority of veterans were men. By law, the U.S. armed
services have, until very recently, placed a two percent quota on the number of women allowed to
serve in the military, thus, laws preferring veterans for public employment overwhelmingly favour
men.
0 Williams, supra note 80, at 6.
9' 442 U.S. 256 at 288, 99 S. Ct. 2282 at 2300 (1979).
9' See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 63, at 1028-32; Farish, The Intent Requirement at the Cross-
roads: Racial Discrimination and City of Memphis v. Greene (1982), 34 Baylor L. Rev. 309 at
309-20 as cited in Lettner, Disparate Impact: Part A: The American Jurisprudence (1983, unpub-
lished) at 10-11; and Scale, supra note 78, at 26-30.
Note here that in cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 1964, the complain-
ant need only show disparate impact to establish a primafacie case; the burden then shifts to the
employer to justify the facially-neutral rules.
11 City of Mobile v. Borden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980), per Marshall J.,
dissenting.
9 Williams, supra note 80, at 6.
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If the discriminatory intent requirement is retained, then certain forms
of sex (and race) discrimination by government will be unchecked. For
these reasons, the establishment of a disproportionate impact should, at
minimum, result in the burden shifting to the government to justify
legislation neutral on its face.
The words "without discrimination" as used in sub-section 15(1)
raise the question of whether the establishment of discriminatory intent
is a necessary element in an equality rights claim under the Charter.
Some commentators think not.98 Nonetheless, the meaning of discrimi-
nation must be explored if Canadian courts, like those in the United
States, require that those who challenge a facially-neutral law must
allege discrimination. There must be a move beyond the limited con-
cept of discrimination as an act of wilful malice to an understanding
that gender or race distinctions, whatever their motivation, perpetuate
a dual system of laws which define women and racial minorities as sec-
ond-class citizens, and should therefore cast a significant burden of jus-
tification upon the government.
In the context of the "ten and forty-five" rule, its adverse dispro-
portionate impact on women must be closely examined because one's
economic security, although not the subject of a fundamental right, af-
fects one's ability to exercise personal freedoms in society. The element
of discrimination might be established by arguing that the "ten and
forty-five" rule was motivated by out-dated, unjust stereotypes about
the roles and capacities of women,99 or that the needs and the essential
worth and dignity of women as a class were ignored in the legislative
process."' 0 Apart from the, statistical evidence of disproportionate im-
pact, support for the argument that the "ten and forty-five" rule is dis-
criminatory might be found in its legislative history. One might also
rely on the historical pattern of discrimination directed against women
98 See, e.g., Gold, A Principled Approach to Equality Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry (1982),
4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 131 at 145-47; and Seale, supra note 80, at 28 and 33. Seale contends that to
establish discrimination one need only show that a distinction has been made on the basis of a
suspicious ground of differentiation. Gold, however, disagrees on this point. He argues (at 146)
that "discrimination" must mean something more than classification; "at a minimum it entails
that the particular group identified in the law must suffer adversely by virtue of the law."
99 Recall that in the United States, gender classifications based on the dichotomous view of
men as "breadwinners" and women as "homemakers and dependents" were struck down. See text
accompanying note 78, supra.
100 This argument implies that equality in group status or treatment should be the dominant
equal protection value. The right to "treatment as an equal" requires that government treat each
individual with equal regard as a person, while the right to "equal treatment" demands that every
person have the same access to the interests as every other person. Both concepts figure in the
arguments made in this paper. The right to equal treatment is the value behind the argument for
full and immediate vesting. For a discussion of these equal protection principles, see Tribe, supra
note 63, at 991-94.
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as well as women's relative powerlessness in the political process to ar-
gue that their interests have been overlooked by the Ontario
legislature.10'
The Ontario legislature will, of course, offer a benign and salutory
purpose for the "ten and forty-five" requirement, for example, to im-
prove employer-sponsored pension plans, or to reward employees who
provide long service.' 0 2 One article suggests that "the court might be
able to infer a discriminatory motive from the fact that the reasons
advanced in justification do not explain adequately the means chosen to
achieve the stated purpose of the law.' 01 3 If the Ontario legislature ad-
vances the purposes suggested, the connection between the means and
the ends will be far from close. As statistics have shown, reducing the
vesting condition from, say, twenty years to ten years means nothing to
someone who changes jobs every five years. The legislative vesting re-
quirement might assist men in acquiring vested pensions, but it does
little to benefit women, who now comprise almost fifty per cent of the
labour force. In defence of the under-inclusiveness of the legislation,
the government might argue that reform may take one step at a time.
However, when the under-inclusiveness of the law, in effect sets apart
women as a class, the means employed by the government should im-
mediately become suspect.0 4
As regards the government justification of rewarding employees
for long service to their employers, the Ontario government might add
that women, as seen by their high rate of turnover, do not exhibit the
loyalty to their employers for which pensions are the payoff. This justi-
fication blames the victim for the poor quality of jobs available to her.
Furthermore, a woman who works all her life for the same employer,
but who stops periodically to bear and raise children, certainly cannot
be called "disloyal". Finally, the notion that a pension is a reward or
gift from the employer is open to criticism. The better view is that
pension benefits are "deferred wages" to which all employees are enti-
tled. In negotiating a collective agreement, it is not unusual for employ-
ees to sacrifice higher wages in exchange for a better pension plan.
102 See Gold, supra note 98, at 145.
202 Gold, supra note 98, at 136, asserts that the court must impose some limits on the objec-
tives pursued by legislation, and require that the purposes invoked in legal argument before the
court actually be the purposes that informed the enactment of the legislation.
103 Id. at 146.
104 It has been reasoned that where unequal results were the reasonably foreseeable conse-
quences of the challenged government action, a failure on the part of the government to correct
these results once they became apparent is itself proof of discriminatory intent. Thus, the standard
of proof is negligence. For a review of this test and others, see Lettner, supra note 95, at 4.
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Once it is determined that the government's articulated purposes
are not met by the "ten and forty-five" rule, then it becomes relatively
easy to draw the inference that the hidden purpose of the Act was to
benefit the typical male worker.
3. "Equal Benefit of the Law"
The inclusion of the concept "equal benefit of the law" in sub-
section 15(1) is generally viewed' 5 as a response to some of the reason-
ing of the Supreme Court of Canada in Bliss. 00 One writer suggests
that "equal benefit of the law" was intended to ensure that the provi-
sion of governmental benefits (like unemployment insurance) was not
insulated from judicial review merely because such benefits are cre-
ations of the legislature. 0 7 If the phrase was intended to encompass
only governmental monetary benefits, then only women employed by
the Ontario government can challenge the "ten and forty-five" rule on
the ground that the rule, in effect, prevents female employees from par-
ticipating equally with men in a deferred government pension. Such an
interpretation would leave women employed in the private sector with-
out a constitutional remedy.
One can argue that the court should not accept elusive legislative
history as being decisive of the question of interpretation. Moreover, a
broader view of "equal benefit of the law" can be supported by refer-
ence to the text of sub-section 15(1), which uses the word "benefit"
and not "benefits". If the drafters of the Charter truly intended that
the phrase be interpreted in its narrowest sense, they could have ex-
pressly provided that only the distribution of government benefits would
be reviewable under sub-section 15(1).
In summary, the language of sub-section 15(1) will likely over-
come the narrow view of equality rights adopted by the Supreme Court
of Canada under the Canadian Bill of Rights. American jurisprudence
pertaining to standards of review and the doctrine of "discriminatory
purpose and disproportionate impact" will assist women in adjudication
under sub-section 15(1) of the Charter. It has been demonstrated that
in the Canadian context, given that the provisions of the Charter place
primary importance on sexual equality, certain modifications of the
American tests are reasonable and appropriate. If, under the Charter,
the strictest standard of review is applied to laws which impact dispro-
105 See, e.g., Hogg, Canada Act 1982 Annotated (1982) at 51; and Gold, supra note 98, at
134.
100 Bliss v. A.G. Can., supra note 56.
107 Gold, supra note 98, at 134.
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portionately on women, and if discriminatory intent may either be in-
ferred from all the relevant facts or does not need to be established by
the challenger under sub-section 15(1), then a challenge of the "ten
and forty-five" rule contained in the Pension Benefits Act must suc-
ceed. This might be the end of the analysis if it were not for section 1
of the Charter.
C. The Limitation Clause: Section 1
Section 1 of the Charter provides that:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and free-
doms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
Section 1 makes clear that the rights and freedoms guaranteed under
the Charter are not absolute. Even though a law has been shown to
breach the provisions of the Charter, there is a possibility that it will be
upheld under section 1, if the government can demonstrate that the law
is justified." 8 What purpose will section 1 serve where a violation of
sub-section 15(1) is established?
The American Bill of Rights contains no limitation clause. It is
clear from the case law, however, that constitutional rights are not ab-
solute in the United States. The American judiciary has developed ap-
proaches to allegations of infringement which inherently place limita-
tions on guaranteed rights. If Canadian courts adopt the American
concept of equal protection of the law, along with the doctrines that
have developed under that concept, then an inquiry under section 1 is
rendered superfluous. By way of illustration, in the United States, the
"discriminatory purpose and disproportionate impact" test must be met
before a facially neutral law can be said to infringe equality rights.
This test necessarily involves an inquiry into whether the government
was motivated by prejudicial purpose, precisely the kind of inquiry con-
templated by section 1. The argument has been made that since equal-
ity rights contain within them the notion that they are not absolute,
recourse to section 1 by the government must be precluded. 10 9 How-
ever, given that section 1 as worded applies to all rights guaranteed in
108 That the burden of justification rests entirely on the person who claims the benefit of the
exception embodified in s. I is now well settled. See Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society
v. Ontario Board of Censors (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 583 at 589-90 (Div. Ct.), aff'd 147 D.L.R. (3d)
58 at 64 (Ont. C.A.); Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards v. A.G. of Quebec (No. 2)
(1983), 140 D.L.R. (3d) 33, at 55, 3 C.R.R. 114 at 136 (Que. Sup. Ct.) aff'd 9 C.R.R. 133
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter Bill 101 case]; Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 11 D.L.R.
(4th) 641.
100 See Seale, supra note 80, at 41.
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the Charter, including equality rights, it would be preferable to give
operative meaning to section 1.
The structure of the inquiry might be as follows; where it is estab-
lished that a facially-neutral law has an unequal impact, as between
the sexes, then sub-section 15(1) is deemed to have been violated. The
burden then shifts automatically under section 1 to the government to
defend the law by showing that the means chosen are relevant to a
legitimate, non-discriminatory purpose. If the purpose articulated by
the government is found to be discriminatory, then the case is won by
those challenging the law. Assuming, however, that the government has
made out a prima facie case, then the onus shifts back to the chal-
lenger to explain the under-inclusiveness of the law by offering a pur-
pose which is discriminatory or otherwise impermissible. Evidence of
such a purpose could be circumstantial, though direct evidence, where
available, would be stronger. Finally, if the person challenging the law
has made out a prima facie case that there is a more plausible ration-
ale for the law than that which was articulated by the government,
then the burden should shift back to the government to refute the
claim. 110
The judicial inquiry as structured in this way would not only give
section 1 a meaningful function, but would also significantly shift the
burden to the person seeking to uphold a facially-neutral law such as
the "ten and forty-five" rule. The effect of the proposed inquiry is that
only a showing of disproportionate impact is needed to establish viola-
tion of sub-section 15(1). Although this inquiry is different from the
American "purpose and impact" test where the burden remains on the
person challenging the law to establish discrimination, as already ar-
gued, it is not unreasonable to expect that the Charter will require a
modification of less protective approaches to sexual equality rights.
With respect to the standard of review under section 1, no clear
consensus has been reached in cases decided thus far under the Char-
ter. The Supreme Court of Canada considered it unnecessary to ad-
dress the question of the impact of section 1 in two of the three Charter
cases it has decided to date."' The Canadian judiciary has acknowl-
110 The structure of inquiry proposed here is a slightly modified version of that recommended
by Gold, supra note 98, at 151-52.
In Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker (1984), 9 D.L.R. (4th) 161, 8 C.R.R. 193,
the Supreme Court of Canada held that s.28(c) of the Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 233 was
not inconsistent with s. 6(2)(b) of the Charter, thus, an analysis of s.I ofthe Charter was unneces-
sary. In Hunter v. Southam, supra note 108, Dickson J. at 37 decided to
[1]eave to another day the difficult question of the relationship between [s.8 and s. I] and,
more particularly, what furthering balancing of interests, if any, may be contemplated by s.
1, beyond that envisaged by s. 8.
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edged that section 1 enlarges the jurisdiction of the courts by investing
them with the power to examine the "rationality" of the law." 2 Al-
though a number of cases establish that the standard of persuasion
under section 1 is a high one, the tests applied under section 1 have
varied."13 Perhaps there is no one pure test for the justification of a
limit. Flexibility may be necessary under the Charter, particularly with
regard to sub-section 15(1) which lists classifications, some of which
appear to be less relevant to the achievement of a legitimate govern-
ment purpose than others. Ultimately, the standard of review chosen
may depend upon the right being threatened and the kind of differenti-
ation used.
IV. CONCLUSION
It has been shown that employer-sponsored pension plans benefit
men more than women because their structure and design are oriented
to the typical- male worker. The Ontario Pension Benefits Act, although
enacted for the purpose of improving pension plans, does not ade-
quately address the four key areas of concern to women; that is, vest-
ing, portability, inflation adjustment, and survivor benefits. A strategy
has been proposed to challenge the Act's "ten and forty-five" vesting
conditions under the equality rights guarantee in section 15 of the
In the third case, A.G. Que. v. Que. Assoc. of Protestant School Boards, supra note 108, the
Supreme Court of Canada did not attempt to formulate a standard of review under s. 1. The court
found in that case that s. 73 of the Charter of the French Language, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-Il rede-
fined for Quebec the classes of persons who were entitled to instruction in the minority language,
and had the effect of creating an exception to s. 23 of the Charter and of amending the Charter. It
was said by the court that a justifiable limit under s. I cannot be equated with exceptions to the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and may not be treated as amendments to the
Charter.
112 See, e.g., the Bill 101 case, supra note 108 at 48-50 (D.L.R.) per Desch6nes C.J.S.C.
113 In the Bill 101 case, id., at 77 (D.L.R.), 156 (C.R.R.), Desch~nes C.J.S.C., speaking for
the majority, after canvassing various authorities, derived the following propositions:
I. A limit is reasonable if it is a proportionate means to attain the purpose of the law;
2. Proof of the contrary involves proof not only of a wrong, but of a wrong which runs
against common sense; and
3. The courts must not yield to the temptation of too readily substituting their opinion for
that of the Legislature.
Although the "proportionality" test bears resemblence to the "rational relationship" test applied
in the United States under the standard of minimal scrutiny, Desch~nes C.J.S.C. actually applies
a muh stricter test when he asks (at 85): "Is the law necessary to achieie the legitimate aim set
by the legislature?" In the result, Bill 101 did not stand up under s. 1. On the other hand, in
Federal Republic of Germany v. Rauca (1983), 38 O.R. (2d) 705 at 715, 141 D.L.R. (3d) 412 at
423, the Ontario High Court of Justice determined that "reasonable limits" imports an objective
test of whether there is a "rationale basis" for a limitation, "a basis that would be regarded as
within the bounds of reason by fair-minded people accustomed to the norms of a free and demo-
cratic society." The court also states that the standard of persuasion to be applied is a high one,
which seems to the author to be incompatible with a mere "rational basis" test.
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Charter. The "ten and forty-five" requirement, though facially-neutral
with respect to sex, is discriminatory in its effect in that more men than
women can achieve vested status under the legislative conditions.
Women are, thus, denied "equal benefit of the law" as guaranteed by
section 15. According to American jurisprudence, the challenger of
such a law must allege discriminatory intent before the fatal standard
of review known as "strict scrutiny" is triggered. It has been argued,
however, that section 1 of the Charter would shift the burden to the
government to show that the "ten and forty-five" rule is relevant to a
legitimate, non-discriminatory purpose. Furthermore, the existence of
the unconditional equality rights guarantee in section 28 of the Charter
provides a strong argument for applying strict scrutiny under section 1
to a law which overwhelmingly favors one sex over another.
The Charter may prove to be the catalyst of needed reform in the
private pension system, especially in the area of vesting. A successful
constitutional challenge of paragraph 20(1)(a) of the Pension Benefits
Act would prod reform by other provincial jurisdictions which have en-
acted mandatory vesting conditions *based on the "ten and forty-five"
rule. Although litigation under sub-section 15(1) of the Charter may
not bring about the fundamental restructuring of the private pension
system which women in Canada rightfully demand, a series of expedi-
ent measures taken by the courts could go a long way to ensuring that
women's pension needs are recognized and addressed by both govern-
ments and employers. It will be necessary for women and their repre-
sentative groups to continue to lobby the decision-makers in the legisla-
tive branch. However, women now have a powerful and influential
instrument in the Charter, which proclaims that sexual equality is an
essential and paramount value in Canadian society.
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